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Depressive illness has acquired a 
paradigmatic position in Western mental 
health thinking and practice during the 
past quarter of a century. Depression is 
considered the most common mental 
disorder globally, and it is estimated to 
become the second most severe public 
health problem worldwide by 2020 (WHO, 
2001). It also epitomises how mental 
disorder or disturbance of psychological 
well-being is understood today by both 
professionals and the lay public. In this 
context, ‘depression’ provides a name and 
form to a common mental health problem 
that can be faced by anyone. Widespread 
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depression is also considered a major 
burden for economy since it reduces the 
capacity to work and productivity of the 
individuals all over the world (e.g. WHO, 
2001). Moreover, depression epidemic is 
often seen as symptomatic of contemporary 
culture or ‘the crisis of the self’, as a kind 
of epochal disease (e.g. Solomon, 2002; 
Ehrenberg, 2010). 
Depression as the paradigm of mental 
disorder–or talk and concern about it–is a 
composite of parallel yet divergent facts and 
definitions. This polyvalence is due to the 
dispersion of professional and public settings 
where mental health is discussed and taken 
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care of; it is an amalgam characterised 
by equivocality and contestation. In fact, 
‘depression’ refers to a problematisation and 
is thus capable of bringing together different 
aspects of contemporary mental health care, 
including all its tensions and fragmentation. 
(Helén, 2007a.) In this paper, I analyse the 
epistemic elements of which depression, the 
primary target of current Western mental 
health care, is made. My aim is to show how 
these elements have historically evolved, 
coalesced, and created the current notion 
of depressive illness, with its ambiguities 
and problems. My analysis is focused on the 
ways depression is understood as an object 
of knowledge and treatment in mental 
health care today. In other words, I study 
how we today conceive of depression as 
something.    
The discussion on depression is certainly 
so voluminous that the point of reference of 
the term is vague. However, the following 
three notions are present in almost 
any account of depression: the quest of 
psychiatrists to identify a depressive disease 
proper; the diagnostic category of ‘major 
depression’; and the epidemiological view 
emphasising the risk factors of depression. 
These three notions are pivotal to our 
understanding and experience of what 
depression is since they delineate the 
space of reasoning in which claims about 
depression are presented, problematised, 
and disputed. 
I think of depression as a mental disease, 
diagnostic criteria of Major Depression and 
depression risks as the forms to understand 
and define maladies involving dejection 
or despondency by the mental health 
experts. Following Ian Hacking (2002: 178-
199), the subject of my analysis is how 
depression is formed and transformed 
as an object of knowledge and treatment 
and how the claims about depressive 
disorders acquire objectivity in the current 
mental health discussions. The data for 
my analysis is collected mainly from the 
realm of psychiatry (see below). However, 
the primary focus of my study is not the 
discussions at the forefront of psychiatric 
science and research. Instead, I concentrate 
on a particular kind of psychiatric discourse 
in which science is applied. As is well 
known, treatment of depressive disorders 
mainly falls within the domain of primary 
health care and is thus carried out by GPs. 
In this context, depression management 
procedures are highly standardized and 
rather homogenous all over the Western 
world. (Callahan & Berrios, 2005; Helén, 
2007a.) Therefore, I focus mostly on a 
psychiatric discourse that facilitates the 
homogenization of depression treatment 
by giving guidance and setting standards 
to diagnostic and therapeutic practices in 
primary health care and for professionals 
with limited psychiatric expertise. I analyze 
an ’applied’ discourse that creates a 
framework of thought in which depression 
becomes conceivable and its treatment gains 
a reasonable basis in current mental health 
care, disseminated in numerous contexts 
and institutions of health care, social 
services and education in which plethora of 
mental problems are encountered. 
My study is based on analyses of three 
sets of research data. The first corpus of data 
consists of discussion on definition and 
classification of depression in Anglo-Saxon 
psychiatry, mainly in Britain, from the 1920s 
to 1980s. In addition, I have analysed the 
Anglo-Saxon psychiatric epidemiology 
and discussion on the management of 
depression in primary care from the late 
1960s to 2000s, authorised guidelines 
included. Finally, the main corpus of 
my research material consists of papers 
and research reports on clinical aspects, 
epidemiology, and treatment of depressive 
illness in Finnish medical and psychiatric 
journals (Psychiatria Fennica, Duodecim, 
and Suomen lääkärilehti), textbooks, special 
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issues of journals, and guidelines and 
instructions for diagnosis and treatment of 
depression and for the use of antidepressants 
from the 1970s to the present day. Articles 
published in international psychiatric or 
medical journals by Finnish doctors are 
also included in the data. I have also used 
information from 8 interviews with Finnish 
primary care physicians, carried out in 2007 
and 2008, to reflect the impact of psychiatric 
discourse to practices. The list of my data is 
attached at the end of the paper.
Ontology in practice 
Why do I focus my analysis in this manner? 
Definitions of what depression is and the 
objectivity of them are essentially formed 
and tested in practices and institutions 
for treatment of people suffering from 
depressive illness. For this reason, my 
analysis is focused on reasoning relevant 
for the public health and clinical practices, 
instead of manifold psychiatric theories 
of depression and mood disorders. Public 
health and clinical contexts are primary for 
the management of depression, therefore 
they are also primary epistemologically and 
ontologically.  
Since I emphasize that discussion and 
knowledge over depression are embedded 
in practices of mental health care, I 
implicitly also claim that our understanding 
of depression is connected to health and 
social policy and practices of social control 
and regulation by public authorities and 
experts in our society.  I have studied 
elsewhere (Helén, 2007a; 2007b; 2010; 
Helén, Hämäläinen & Metteri, 2011; 
Hautamäki, Helén & Kanula, 2011) the 
reciprocity of the emergence of the current 
notion of depressive disorder and the 
changes in the psychiatric institution and 
mental health policy or, in Jasanoff’s (2004) 
terms, ‘co-production’ of an assemblage of 
mental health management and depression 
as an object of knowledge. In this paper, the 
dimensions of social control and mental 
health politics are secondary and not 
systematically analyzed, while I concentrate 
on the epistemic aspects of formation of 
the depression assemblage. The subject of 
this paper is a history of the mode by which 
depression is known today, i.e. a history of 
depression as an epistemic thing, evolved 
with depression as a thing to be treated.  
  I approach depression as a mental 
disease, diagnostic criteria of Major 
Depression and depression risks by tracking 
their emergence and metamorphosis in a 
specific context of mental health thinking 
and practice. In the first two sections of my 
paper, I focus on the psychiatric discussion 
of endogenous depression that is a historical 
attempt and problem to define depressive 
illness as a clear-cut disease with definite 
physiological cause and course, in a 
manner similar to modern medicine. My 
discussion in these sections is based on the 
analysis of the discussion on definition and 
classification of depression in Anglo-Saxon 
psychiatry, mainly in Britain, from the 1920s 
to 1980s, and I situate my analysis in the 
historical context by reviewing research 
literature on the topic.
The next section highlights the most 
important element of the current depression 
paradigm, namely the diagnostic category 
of Major Depression in the DSM-III, DSM-
IV and ICD-10 manuals. My discussion 
is primarily based on review and re-
interpretation of research literature, but I 
also ground my argument on the analysis of 
the Anglo-Saxon and Finnish mental health 
discussion on depression from the 1970s to 
the present day. In this section, I particularly 
emphasise the role of the new nosographic 
rationale in psychiatry, aimed at stabilising 
diagnostic entities for clinical and research 
purposes, in creating the current diagnostic 
confusion in current mental health practices 
and facilitating the expansion of depression 
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into an epidemic proportion (see Helén, 
2007b; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007; Rose, 
2006). 
In the two sections to follow, the focus 
of analysis is on depression as a public 
health problem. My discussion is based 
primarily on the analysis of the Anglo-Saxon 
and Finnish psychiatric epidemiology of 
depression and the Finnish discussion on 
depression by mental health experts and 
medical authorities from the 1970s to the 
present day, and this analysis is put in a 
historical context by reviewing research 
literature on the topic. In particular, I discuss 
the implementation of the idea of risk into 
mental health thinking and practice by 
psychiatric epidemiology and the role of 
risk rationale in the treatment of depressive 
illness. A core result of my analysis is that 
epidemiology and the notion of risk have 
had pivotal impact on current mental health 
care and depression treatment rationale.  
The topic of my discussion in the closing 
section on the paper is how the quest for 
depression as a neurophysiological disease, 
consolidation of Major Depression as the 
diagnostic core of mood disorders, and the 
central role of the epidemiological notion 
of risk are both interlocked and discordant 
with each other in the current depression 
paradigm. In addition, I also point out 
tendencies subverting the depression 
paradigm.   
Since I study what depression is for us 
and how we conceive of it as an object, as 
something, I discuss ontology of depression 
in this paper. Following Ian Hacking (2002), 
I consider this ontology historical, which 
means that the ways depression exists for 
us or, rather, we think and feel depression 
exists, can change and is even bound to 
change. Further, the analysis of historical 
ontology of depression relates to historical 
and philosophical reflection or a critique 
of ourselves, our time and our world, 
our condition humane. Finally, historical 
ontology of depression is about being a 
person, or moral subject, today:
Historical ontology [analyses] to what is 
possible to be or to do. (...) [It] is about 
the ways in which the possibilities for 
choice, and for being, arise in history 
(...) in terms of explicit formations 
in which we constitute ourselves. 
Historical ontology is not so much 
about the formation of character as 
about the space of possibilities for 
character formation that surround 
a person, and create potentials for 
’individual experience’. (Hacking, 2002: 
22-23.)
However, I do not study here the 
relationship between the concepts of the 
self and personhood within the depression 
paradigm or practices of the self under 
depression treatment. Instead, I focus 
on depression as a thing or an object. 
However, I do not assume that talking about 
endogenous depression, major depression 
or the risks for depression is a way to 
objectify the experience of depression. 
On the contrary, I claim that experiences 
become conceivable for us as depression 
only by becoming objects of mental health 
care, i.e. by becoming something to which 
objectivity can be attributed in the context 
of mental health thinking and practice. 
In other words, psychiatric objectivity is a 
prerequisite of our experience of depression. 
This claim or assumption is based on an 
idea, inspired by Annemarie Mol (2002), that 
ontology of depression is practical. What is 
is not detachable of what is done, and that is 
the reason why I concentrate on discussions 
and reasoning relevant for public health 
and clinical management of depressive 
illness. This focus is also historically 
justified, because our time is characterised 
by the conviction that something can and 
should be done about persistent sadness, 
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low spirits or feelings of nothingness. 
Consequently, numerous efforts to detect, 
control and treat this ‘depression’ have 
arisen out of this therapeutic ethos. The 
requirements of treatment from diagnosis to 
cure assessment determine how depression 
is conceived of and defined, i.e. what we 
consider depression to be is based on the 
idea of its treatability.
All in all, my aim in this paper is to show 
how the conceptualisations of depression 
as a neurophysiological disease, as a 
diagnostic category of Major Depression, 
and as risk factors provide treatable objects 
for current practices and technologies of 
depression management and direct the 
actual treatment. I will also highlight the 
problematisations in which these three 
concepts of depression are involved, both 
as solutions to shortcomings of mental 
health thinking and practice and as 
sources of problems. My argument is that 
at the core of the both merits and perils 
of the current depression paradigm is the 
tendency to think of depression as well as 
other mood disorders as objects instead of 
as an experience with a specific context; 
and, as Emily Martin (2007: 220) says, 
‘movement toward thing-like status makes 
mania and depression seem possible to 
identify, manipulate, and optimize through 
the technology of psychotropic drugs and 
through taxonomic apparatuses.’ 
Endogenous depression
In the current professional and lay 
discussions of depression, the term 
‘endogenous depression’ is rarely used. Why 
then do I discuss it here? The reason is simple. 
Dispute over ‘endogenous depression’ 
provides a historical example of how two 
tendencies of psychiatric understanding 
of depression have interfered with one 
another. On the one hand, mental health 
professionals have tended to conceive of 
depression as a broad, multidimensional 
phenomenon. On the other hand, they 
have shown a persistent attempt, even 
urge, to isolate a depressive disease 
proper with strictly defined symptoms 
and aetiology, often neurophysiological 
aetiology, from the amorphous multiplicity 
of depressiveness. In a sense, the concept 
of endogenous depression was an early 
definition, although rather obscure, of 
depression as a biological condition, a ‘brain 
disease’. Today, neuropsychiatric concepts 
of depression suggest far more specific 
neurophysiological ‘causes’ of depressive 
disorders; nevertheless, the problem of 
defining the borders of depressive illness 
has not vanished from the mental health 
discussion, and the topic is even more 
intensively debated today than in the early 
20th century. 
The term ‘endogenous’ leads back to the 
beginnings of biopsychiatry in the late 19th 
century. The term was first used as a scientific 
concept in early 19th-century botany, and it 
was introduced into psychiatry in 1892 by 
Paul Möbius, a psychiatrist from Leipzig. He 
used ‘endogenous’ to mean a special kind 
of biological aetiology of mental illness, in 
contrast to mental illnesses that he called 
‘exogenous’. He used ‘exogenous’ to refer to 
brain lesions caused by accidents or somatic 
illness, but it also referred to Irresein due to 
external causes like poisoning. By contrast, 
‘endogenous’ referred to biological causes 
of mental illness that were internal to the 
individual, and of these causes Möbius 
considered hereditary predisposition to 
be the most relevant. In other words, the 
term ‘endogenous’ originally emerged from 
the 19th -century theory of degeneration. 
(Jackson, 1986, 211-212; Lewis, 1971: 191; 
Schmidt-Degenhard, 1983: 100.)
The concept was also significant to 
Emil Kraepelin. Throughout the various 
editions of Psychiatrie, in which he 
presented his influential definition of the 
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two major forms of mental illness, he also 
contrasted endogenous mental illnesses 
with exogenous illnesses as well as with 
functional ones. However, ‘endogenous’ 
was not one of Kraepelin’s key concepts, 
and its meaning remained equivocal. 
He did not associate it with the ideas of 
degeneration as many German psychiatrists 
at the turn of the century did (see Lewis, 
1971: 192). He mostly used the term to refer 
to the progression of mental dementia, 
and it had a primarily clinical meaning. In 
the famous sixth edition of his psychiatric 
textbook, he considered both dementia 
praecox and manic-depressive disease 
endogenous. In later editions, Kraepelin 
related ‘endogenous’ to the main criteria by 
which he differentiated dementia praecox 
from manic-depressive disease. While the 
course of the former illness was a chronic 
condition and its course was characterised 
by progressive dementia, the latter was 
periodic, did not involve cognitive decline, 
and recovery from it was possible; thus 
manic-depressive illness was a functional 
psychopathology, not an endogenous one. 
(Healy, 2008: 71-74; Jackson, 1986: 189-190; 
Schmidt-Degenhard, 1983: 100-101). There 
is some irony in this because depressive 
illness was at the centre of psychiatric 
debate over endogenous diseases in the 
early 20th century (see below). 
As Kraepelin’s influence increased in 
Western psychiatry during the first three 
decades of the 20th century, the opposition 
between endogenous and exogenous also 
became widely applied in the psychiatric 
discourse, first in Germany and later in 
Britain and the USA. The meaning of the 
dichotomy varied and became fuzzy. It 
disappeared from the sphere of biological 
aetiology and became a general psychiatric 
concept, with both aetiological and clinical 
meanings. Gradually, psychogenic causes 
slid into the exogenous category, and 
many psychiatrists began to call all, even 
presumed, organic causes as endogenous. 
(Jackson, 1986: 212-213; Lewis, 1971: 191-
193.) Aubrey Lewis commented on the 
situation retrospectively that eventually the 
term ‘endogenous’ referred to ‘hypothetical, 
intangible, elusive predispositions, 
constitutional or hereditary forces which 
could be conjectured but not demonstrated’. 
In the end, most psychiatric authorities 
avowed that ‘the endogenous concept, 
though logically requisite, was really a cover 
for a purely negative approach representing 
as internal causes what was left when all 
external causes had been eliminated.’ 
(Lewis, 1971: 193.)
The development by which the division 
between endogenous and exogenous 
mental diseases was changed, multiplied 
and blurred was particularly important for 
psychiatric thinking on depressive illness; 
in fact, the terms were mainly applied in 
discussions of depression. Kraepelin’s 
subsumption of all depressive pathologies 
into the category of manic-depressive 
illness (see Healy, 2008: 71-74) faced much 
criticism in early 20th -century psychiatry. 
Critical opinions gave the impetus for 
the introduction of numerous definitions 
of depression proper, i.e. endogenous 
depression, as well as the introduction 
of the idea of ‘reactive’ or ‘neurotic’ 
depression. This happened in Germany 
already in the 1910s, whereas in Britain and 
the U.S. depressive psychopathologies were 
discussed from the late 1920s onwards. 
Unsurprisingly, the view on depressive 
states was far from uniform. Mental health 
experts disagreed about the definition 
of endogenous depression as distinct 
from ‘reactive’, ‘neurotic’ or ‘exogenous’ 
depressions–and quite a few authorities were 
eager to present their own classifications. 
Moreover, psychiatrists debated whether or 
not endogenous depression as a rigid disease 
entity even exists. The discussion was most 
intensive in the Anglo-Saxon psychiatry in 
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the 1930s and early 1940s. Particularly in 
British psychiatry, depressive illness was 
a major topic at that time. Differentiation 
between ‘autonomous’ (i.e. endogenous) 
and ‘reactive’ depression by Robert 
Gillespie (1929) provided a starting point 
for numerous attempts to define clinically 
valid categories and descriptions of the 
different types of depression (e.g. Curran, 
1937; Hamilton & White, 1959; Lewis, 1934b; 
Pollitt, 1965). However, an unambiguous 
definition of clinical depression as a disease 
was not consolidated, and until the 1970s 
psychiatric discussion on depression was 
a farrago of idiosyncratic definitions and 
theories.1 (Hill, 1968: 447-450; Lewis, 1934b: 
361-363; 1971: 192-196; see also Jackson, 
1986: 211-216.)     
Text Book of Psychiatry by David 
Henderson and Robert Gillespie provides 
an illustration of this conceptual instability. 
The book promoted clinical emphasis in 
British psychiatry and was very influential 
since it remained a major reference from 
the 1920s to the 1960s. In the first edition 
from 1927, manic-depressive psychosis 
was seen as a major form of the affective 
reaction type, and Henderson and Gillespie 
separated endogenous manic-depressive 
psychosis from ‘reactive depression’. In the 
former, there was no readily perceptible 
cause for the onset of illness, whereas a 
precipitating factor was involved in the 
latter. However, when discussing the 
neurotic reaction type in the 9th edition from 
1962, Henderson and Gillespie concluded 
that the difference between endogenous 
and reactive depression was arbitrary. 
Aubrey Lewis, the biggest authority in 
British psychiatry, shared this view and 
emphasised that depressive illness should 
be seen as a continuum (Lewis, 1971).
An obvious reason for the above 
conceptual confusion was Adolf Meyer’s 
view on depression. Meyer was very 
influential in U.S. mental health care before 
the Second World War, and his ideas also 
weighed heavily in British psychiatry, e.g. 
through the works of Aubrey Lewis and 
David Henderson. One way to characterise 
Meyer’s concept is to say that he rejected a 
categorical view of mental illness in favour 
of a dimensional one, so that depression 
referred to a dimension of mental health and 
ill health. The core of his ‘psychobiology’ 
was the idea that psychopathologies should 
be considered types of abnormal reactions 
instead of disease categories. Abnormality 
referred to deficiencies in adjustment of 
an individual, and reaction type was an 
extremely flexible concept covering a range 
of meanings from biological adaptation to 
personality. Meyer listed six reaction types, 
or ‘disorders’, and one of them was ‘affective 
reaction type’, with ‘manic-depressive type’, 
‘anxiety type’ and ‘simple depression’ as its 
subtypes. (Meyer, 1952.) This view formed a 
bedrock for much of psychiatric discussion 
of depression before the late 1960s and even 
later, as the above discussion of depression 
by Henderson and Gillespie illustrates. 
Furthermore, the Meyerian approach 
focused on the case, the person under 
treatment, his or her personality type and 
difficulties in personal ‘adjustment’. For 
such a view, clearly demarcated disease 
entities were secondary in understanding 
and treating mental illness. (Lewis, 1934a: 
33-34; Hill, 1968: 450-451; Jackson, 1986: 
195-200.) Such an emphasis certainly kept 
endogenous depression or other ideas of 
depressive illness being as a brain disease 
on the sidelines. 
Before moving on, it should be noted that 
the above discussion took place in the world 
of mental hospitals and hard-core psychiatry 
working mostly with hospitalised patients, 
often with psychotic and chronic conditions, 
or with patients in intensive outpatient care. 
Private psychotherapeutic practice and 
general mental hygiene were marginal in this 
discussion, and the phenomenon we know 
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today as primary care depression would 
have seem quite strange to  the practice and 
the professional experience that the above 
discussion of depression was embedded 
in. Moreover, depressive pathologies 
were marginal subjects in both psychiatry 
and psychodynamic therapy. Especially 
in the U.S., schizophrenia dominated 
thinking and practice in institutional 
psychiatry, while mental health experts 
with psychoanalytic orientation were 
interested in phenomena included under 
the broad heading ‘anxiety’ (e.g. Cooper et 
al., 1972; Hale, 1995: 47-52). Consequently, 
the context for problematisation of 
depression was different from ours. Today, 
the modification of psychiatry and its 
expansion into mental health care and the 
rise of biological explanations of mental 
disorders characterise the situation in 
which depression is the paradigm of mental 
disorders.
Pharmacological takeover
Confusion over the distinction between 
endogenous and neurotic depressions 
remained more or less unchanged until 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. In fact, 
the psychiatric discussion of depression 
was rather subdued on both sides of the 
Atlantic after the Second World War. The 
rising field of psychopharmacology was an 
exception, and ‘endogenous depression’ 
was re-conceptualised in this context. As is 
well known, an antidepressant compound 
was simultaneously discovered by Roland 
Kuhn in Switzerland and Nathan Kline in 
the U.S. in 1957. Due to this invention, the 
idea of depression as a distinct brain disease 
was revived, and a new rationale emerged 
to provide empirical evidence for this idea. 
Roland Kuhn provided a sort of paradigm 
for the new pharmacological reasoning. 
In the mid-1950s he tried out a compound 
later known as imipramine on hospitalised 
patients diagnosed as depressives. He 
noticed that the medication reduced the 
patients’ symptoms, and he claimed that the 
effect revealed a specific biological disorder. 
Using Kurt Schneider’s term from the 1920s, 
Kuhn called it ‘vital depression’. Kuhn’s study 
did not cause a sensation in psychiatry, and 
the pharmaceutical company Geigy, which 
Kuhn worked for, was not very impressed, 
either. The remarkable thing about Kuhn’s 
study was its logic. Kuhn’s claim that this 
mental disease existed was based on the 
existence of a chemical compound that 
had an effect on patients with a certain 
diagnosis. In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
emphasis on neurochemistry increased in 
psychopharmacology and neuropsychiatry, 
and receptor and neurotransmitter activities 
became the main points of interest. This 
development did not sweep away the 
rationale illustrated by Kuhn’s study and 
on the contrary consolidated it. Theories 
of neurochemical malfunctions as causes 
of major mental illness were presented 
on the basis of drug effect evidence, 
among them the monoamine hypothesis 
of depression. The idea of depression as a 
‘pure’ brain disease also played a role. In 
discussions of the monoamine hypothesis, 
the term ‘endogenous depression’ referred 
to, besides a certain cluster of symptoms, 
abnormal metabolism of a neurotransmitter 
in the brain, and it was contrasted with 
heterogeneous forms of ‘reactive’ or 
‘neurotic’ depression. (Healy, 1997: 48-56, 
76-77, 155-165; 2002, 198-219.)
Geigy’s 1959 promotion leaflet for 
Tofranil, the product name of imipramine, 
illustrates well how this re-interpretation, 
or takeover, of endogenous depression by 
psychopharmacology happened. Already 
in the late 1950s, scientific reservations 
and ambiguities were not included in 
commercial information about psychotropic 
drugs–a practice that continues even today 
in the marketing of psychotropic drugs (see 
e.g. Lacasse & Leo, 2005). In Geigy’s leaflet, 
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lack of clarity and controversies about 
depression were brushed aside by means 
of old recipes. First, elements of ‘classic’ 
melancholia were deployed to delineate 
depressive disease; second, endogenous 
depression was claimed to have a clear-
cut aetiology in the same manner that 19th 
-century psychiatrists thought of psychic 
constitution and hereditary insanity. The 
new element in the argument was the 
close connection between the drug and 
depressive illness.
Endogenous depression is the major 
indication for the thymoleptic Tofranil. Of 
all the depressive states, true endogenous 
depression provides the ‘classic’ 
picture of Depression. The cardinal 
triad of symptoms, namely, depressed 
mood, lowering of vital functions and 
psychomotor retardation, together make 
up the actual depressive syndrome. (...)
Heredity is an important factor in 
endogenous depression and can be 
demonstrated in the majority of patients. 
Before the outbreak of the psychosis 
patients are often of cyclothymic 
disposition with a tendency of ‘mood-
swings’. Most of them belong to the pycnic 
constitutional body type. About 70% are 
women. (Geigy, 1959: 1-3.)
The way the connection between Tofranil 
and the definition of depressive illness 
is presented in the leaflet seems quite 
current. However, this reasoning was 
still situated in the context of Kraepelin’s 
concept of manic-depressive disease. The 
description of depression is congruent with 
the contemporary clinical picture of the 
depressive phase of the mania-depression 
cycle, and the list of symptoms also include 
delusions, which refers back to early 19th-
century medical views of melancholy or even 
earlier discussions. There is also something 
new. Earlier in the 20th century, ‘endogenous’ 
referred to a plausible but unknown ‘brain 
defect’ causing depressive illness. In Geigy’s 
leaflet this logic of the unknown is applied 
to the drug: imipramine/Tofranil definitely 
affects depression, but the biochemical or 
neurophysiological mechanism of the effect 
is not (yet) known:
The marked success with Tofranil in 
endogenous depression can be explained 
by the fact that it directly influences the 
depressive syndrome and acts causally 
on the underlying pathological mental 
state, the ‘core’ of the depression. It must 
remain an open question where this 
‘core’ is to be found and whether it is 
related to a particular part of the brain. 
(Geigy, 1959: 1)
The close connection between endogenous 
depression and the drug in Geigy’s leaflet 
reflected the attempts to define and classify 
mental diseases on the basis of drug 
cartography (see Radden, 2003: 44-45). In 
the 1950s and 1960s, psychopharmacology 
researchers were occupied with drug 
cartography, when they tried to define 
depressive disease proper and other mental 
disorders on the basis of drug effects. 
At that time, quite a few studies were 
carried out that defined subtypes of affective 
disorders on the basis of drug response, 
and many scholars firmly believed that 
the nosography of mental disorders could 
soon be anchored in neurophysiology 
and neurochemisty. (E.g. Overall et al., 
1966; Schildkraut et al., 1978; see Healy, 
1997: 52-77.) As psychopharmacology and 
neuropsychiatry have expanded in Western 
mental health care, one may assume 
that endogenous depression or a similar 
concept has been equally triumphant in the 
current mental health discourse (cf. Healy, 
1997: 71-72, 76-77). But it has not. In the 
past three decades, the distinction between 
endogenous and neurotic depression and 
even the terms themselves have been widely 
dismissed. 
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The fading away of the concept of 
endogenous depression was embedded in 
two developments in Western psychiatry. 
First, there has been an internal tendency of 
psychopharmacology to define the object of 
anti-depressant medication ambiguously. 
For Roland Kuhn, vital depression was a 
specific disease for which imipramine was 
a cure, whereas Nathan Kline, the other 
pioneer of antidepressant medication, 
thought that all kinds of depressive states 
had a biological origin and that medication 
was therefore suitable for depression in 
general. In fact, he called the antidepressants 
‘psychic energisers’. (Healy, 1997: 66, 70-
72.) This controversy between the specific 
and nonspecific biopsychiatric models of 
depression did not emerge in the discussions 
of psychopharmacology. Instead, it 
stemmed from the debate in the 1930s and 
1940s whether electric shocks were useful 
only in treating depression ‘proper’ or also 
neurotic depressions. A similar debate was 
carried out in psychopharmacology in the 
late 1950s and 1960s, and the latter opinion 
has gradually proved to be victorious. 
(Ehrenberg, 2004: 55-57, 74-82; Hill, 1968: 
449-450.) However, there was still ambiguity 
about the scope of use of the tricyclic 
antidepressants from the late 1960s to the 
1980s. Imipramine and amitriptyline were 
marketed for a wide range of depressions, 
but quite a few psychophamacologists 
and clinicians working with patients in 
psychiatric hospitals had an understanding 
that antidepressant medication was a 
treatment for a specific depressive disease. 
Donald Klein suggested naming the 
condition ‘endogenomorphic depression’ 
(Jackson, 1986: 218), but the psychiatrists 
usually discussed vital or endogenous 
depression. Yet, this view was controversial 
among Anglo-Saxon psychiatrists and 
it was gradually abandoned by the late 
1980s; at that time Prozac and other SSRI 
were introduced in the mental health care 
practices. (Healy, 1997: 70-77; Hill, 1968: 
449-450.)
The second and most important 
development that has eclipsed the 
concept of endogenous depression is the 
implementation of the new system of 
classification of mental disorders in Western 
mental health care since the 1980s. I discuss 
the making of the DSM-III manual and the 
breakthrough of new classificatory rationale 
in detail in the next two sections; here I 
make only a brief remark about its impact. 
At first sight, it seems a bit strange 
that the idea of depression as a specific 
psychopathology was blurred by the 
consolidation of DSM-rationale in mental 
health care. The purpose of the new 
classification was to provide well-defined 
categories of mental disorders that can be 
applied in all clinical work and psychiatric 
research. The experimental reasoning of 
biopsychiatry and the classificatory and 
statistical reasoning of neo-raepelinian 
psychiatry also converge in the idea that 
depression can be defined as a distinct 
pathological entity, so it was conceived 
of as a natural kind of object. Historically, 
psychiatrists who oriented themselves 
towards biological research were the first to 
develop a unified diagnostic classification 
for research purposes. In general, the 
revival of classificatory psychiatry and the 
rise of mental health epidemiology have 
paved the way for the triumphant march of 
biopsychiatry during the past two decades. 
(Cooper, 2004: 18; Healy, 1997: 98-101, 233-
234; 2002: 299-302; Mayes & Horwitz, 2005: 
263-265.) Against this background, it seems 
justified to say that the category of ‘major 
depression’ in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is firmly 
rooted in biopsychiatry. 
However, ‘major depression’ as the 
central category of mood disorders is 
constructed on the basis of clinical and 
epidemiological data in DSM-III and 
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other similar psychiatric classifications 
(DSM-IV and ICD-10). In these manuals, 
major depression is conceived of as a 
purely descriptive entity, consisting of the 
listed symptoms without reference to any 
biological or other cause of illness. Empirical 
reasoning, aimed at being clinically relevant, 
is the foundation of neo-Kraepelinian 
psychiatry, and it cuts depression’s 
umbilical cord to neuroaetiology. Robert 
Spitzer, the mastermind of the DSM 
revolution, summarised this rationale in the 
following way: 
The general approach towards 
classification to be taken in DSM-III is 
to use aetiology as a classification axis if 
there is convincing evidence to support 
it. In the absence of such evidence, 
categories are grouped together if they 
share important clinical-descriptive 
features. (...) For this reason, we have 
decided to group together nearly all of 
the disorders which are characterized 
by a disturbance of mood. This includes 
all of the depressions and manias ... 
(Spitzer et al. 1977; Sit. Jackson, 1986: 
218.)
By the end of the 20th century, the diagnostic 
criteria of major depression in DSM-III, 
DSM-IV and ICD-10 became the gold 
standard definition of depressive illness 
in clinical, administrative, policy and 
research activities in Western mental health 
care (see below), and ‘major depression’ 
defined the target of an antidepressant drug 
also in psychopharmacological research, 
especially in clinical trials (Healy, 2002: 
303-308). As a consequence, the ‘specific’ 
object of the antidepressant medication 
was primarily the symptoms listed in the 
classification manual. However, this model 
of depressive disorder is also shattering 
because of a growing tendency in both 
professional and lay understanding of 
depression to follow a new kind of drug 
cartography. A reverse mode of mapping 
mood disorders according to drug effects 
as compared to the drug cartography of the 
1950s and 1960s has become dominant in 
recent decades. When SSRI antidepressants 
(Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors) 
were introduced into clinical use and the 
market in the late 1980s, they were mostly 
used in the treatment of ‘mild’ depressions. 
Quite soon they were also applied in ‘off 
label’ treatment of, for example, obsessive 
Figure 1. Elements of depression (Tamminen, 2001: 57).
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compulsive disorder, panic disorder, eating 
disorders, states of anxiety or phobia, and 
even sexual paraphilias, and they were later 
licenced for these uses. (Healy, 1997: 176-
177; 211-213; Rose, 2004: 112-118.) 
The Finnish depression expert Tapani 
Tamminen (2001) summarises the current 
trend in the figure 1. It shows the main rock 
of depression and smaller rocks of disorders 
hidden in ‘the sea of life’, which have the 
potential to wreck personal mental health. 
With the expansion of SSRI treatment, the 
interfaces of depressive illness multiply, 
and the dilemmas of differential diagnosis 
become more difficult. As a consequence, 
the scope of depression keeps on widening 
and becoming more heterogeneous. 
Major depression
  
The third and fourth editions of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
authorised by the American Psychiatric 
Association, and the new nosographic 
rationale serving as its foundation have had 
a major role in the profound transformation 
of mental health care seen in the Western 
world and even globally during the past 
three decades. This is an incontestable 
historical fact. (E.g. Mayes & Horwitz, 2005.) 
The classification of mental illnesses was re-
enthroned and reformulated as a response 
to the problems of professional integrity 
that weighed down especially Anglo-Saxon 
psychiatry in the 1950s and the 1960s. The 
fundamental problems were related to both 
clinical practice and scientific research.  
The situation of depression diagnostics 
with numerous mutually incompatible 
classifications of the disorder illustrates 
well the general situation in Western 
psychiatry after the Second World War. 
In the early 1960s, psychiatrists on both 
sides of the Atlantic were alarmed by the 
growing evidence of inconsistent diagnostic 
practices. The diagnosis of schizophrenia 
was particularly problematic; patients 
diagnosed as schizophrenic by U.S. clinicians 
were diagnosed as depressed or neurotic by 
the British. Conferences of key figures of 
psychiatric professions were summoned to 
tackle this problem. At the same time, the 
World Health Organization started efforts to 
clarify disease classification, including that 
of mental diseases. (Healy, 2002: 297-299.) 
Idiosyncratic diagnostic classifications 
were obstacles also for psychiatric 
research. During the 1960s, the interest 
in biological studies of mental illness and 
in epidemiology grew and clinical drug 
trials increased, especially in the U.S. 
These developments created a demand 
for eradicating fuzzy definitions of mental 
disorders. Diagnostic criteria for psychiatric 
research, out of which DSM-III evolved, 
were started to develop in the late 1960s. 
The research group lead by Eli Robins and 
Samuel Guze at Washington University in St. 
Louis constructed the classifications of 15 
mental disorders, depression included, on 
the basis of statistical analysis of symptoms. 
This classification, known as the Feighner 
Criteria, was published in 1972. Three years 
later the group of scholars from many U.S. 
universities, advocated by the National 
Institute of Mental Health, published the 
operational criteria for 25 central mental 
conditions to be applied in psychiatric 
research.2 This Research Diagnostic Criteria 
(RDC) was important for two reasons. For 
the first time, ‘major depression’ was used 
to name the main category of depressive 
illness. Furthermore, Robert Spitzer, later 
the chair of the DSM-III committee, was 
a core member of the research group 
that defined the RDC. At this point, the 
list of diagnostic criteria was considered 
to be a standardised tool for psychiatric 
research, and the idea of its use in clinical or 
therapeutic purposes had not yet occurred 
to mental health experts. (Healy, 2002: 299-
301; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 91-100.) 
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In 1974, the APA set up a committee 
to make a new classification of mental 
diseases. The project was to a great extent 
manoeuvred by scientifically minded 
epidemiologists and biopsychiatrists. Their 
motive was not only to turn psychiatry 
into a proper medical science but also to 
challenge psychoanalytic hegemony in U.S. 
mental health care. From the perspective 
they called neo-Kraepelinian, mental illness 
was conceived of as clear-cut ‘disorders’ that 
can be unambiguously defined as groups 
of symptoms, free of metapsychological or 
aetiological concepts and elements. The 
symptom lists and the grouping of disorders 
in the new classification were based on 
evidence from epidemiological studies, on 
statistical meta-analyses of former studies 
and clinical field trials, and on consensus 
views of subcommittees specialised in 
particular groups of psychiatric illness. 
(Healy, 1997: 233-237; Mayes & Horwitz, 
2005: 258-263; Wilson, 1993; for a detailed 
analysis, see Kirk & Kutchins, 1992.) Clinical 
experience had a secondary role in this 
work since bed- or couchside knowledge 
was considered too idiosyncratic and not 
objective enough. (Healy, 2002: 320-333; 
Helén, 2007a: 160)     
The result was published in 1980 as 
DSM-III, and the process to revise it started 
immediately. The revised version came out 
in the late 1980s, the new edition (DSM-IV) 
in 1994, and the fifth edition is expected to 
be released in 2012, at the earliest. There are 
a number of reasons why efforts to define 
a unified basis for psychiatry have turned 
into an ongoing process. Administrative 
manoeuvres, professional competition, and 
pressures from outside the psychiatric field 
have been equally, if not more, influential 
than scientific criteria in drawing up the 
DSM, and that has made the mental disorder 
categories perplexing and suspect (for an 
overview, see Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Mayes 
& Horwitz, 2005). Moreover, epistemological 
and ontological problems in defining the 
concept mental disorder and in delineating 
clinical entities are conspicuous, and many 
clinicians and psychotherapists find the 
categories and diagnostic criteria of both 
the DSM and the WHO’s ICD-10 in many 
ways inconvenient or trivial when applied 
to individual cases in clinical practice (e.g. 
Cooper, 2004; Riikonen & Mattila, 1994; 
Wakefield, 1992; Wakefield et al., 2002; see 
also Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Rose, 2006: 477-
478; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007). 
Despite the shortcomings of the DSM and 
ICD-10 and the criticism they have faced, 
the new nosological approach has proved to 
be revolutionary in Western psychiatry, and 
the classifications are now an important 
cog in the mental health machinery. The 
key to their success lay in the expanded use 
of the diagnostic criteria. After DSM-III, 
they were no longer restricted to research 
purposes; instead, ‘[the] highest priority has 
been to provide a helpful guide to clinical 
practice’, as the editors of DSM-IV defined 
their mission. They also acknowledge that 
the official classification of mental disorders 
‘must be applicable in a wide diversity of 
contexts [and] be usable across settings’ 
(DSM-IV-TR: xxiii). The DSM and ICD-10 
manuals have fulfilled this task so well that 
they are today indispensable for almost 
any activity of mental health care because 
they enable the translation of mental 
disorders from one context to another. The 
checklists of symptoms provide a common 
point of reference and a delineation of 
psychiatric phenomena especially suited 
for administration, policy making, and 
health insurance institutions. They can 
also be easily adopted and deployed in 
epidemiological, pharmaceutical and 
clinical research, in clinical and therapeutic 
practices and institutions, as well as in drug 
marketing and self-help guidebooks or on 
Internet sites. The lists of symptoms are 
both specific enough and flexible enough to 
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allow the notions of, for example, depression 
or anxiety to move between different mental 
health settings. In fact, the expansion and 
metamorphosis of psychiatry into mental 
health care work in every corner of society 
would have been impossible without such a 
medium of communication. Thus, the DSM 
provides the common language. (Lakoff, 
2005: 12-14; Horwitz, 2002: 70-80; Mayes & 
Horwitz, 2005: 250-251, 263-266; Wilson, 
1993: 408-409.)
Depressive illness and affective disorders 
were not among the most passionately 
debated diagnostic categories in the making 
of DSM-III. At the end of the 1960s and the 
beginning of the 1970s, many commentators 
representing both clinically oriented 
psychiatrists and researchers focusing on 
the biology or chemistry of depression 
were ready to give up the problematic idea 
of endogenous depression and suggested 
‘primary depression’ as a simple descriptive 
category to replace it (e.g. Heron, 1965; Hill, 
1968; Lewis, 1971; Robins & Guze, 1972; see 
also Whybrow, Akiskal & McKinney, 1984: 
46-50). This was essentially carried out 
through the establishment of the category 
of ‘major depression’. However, the DSM 
revolution not only clouded the category of 
endogenous depression but also did away 
with neurotic depression. This was due to 
the efforts of Spitzer’s steering committee 
to eradicate psychoanalytic influence 
from the new classification. In particular, 
anything referring to neurosis was a red 
flag to the neo-Kraepelinian proclamation. 
(Healy, 1997: 235-236; 2002, 303-304; Mayes 
& Horwitz, 2005: 261-263; Wilson, 1993: 
407). As ‘neurotic depression’ was erased, 
the dichotomy between endogenous 
and neurotic or reactive depression also 
vanished, which further obscured the idea 
of a depressive disease proper. 
Mood disorders were thus combined in 
one class of mental disorders in DSM-III, 
DSM-IV and, ICD-10, and major depression 
became the paradigm. Major depression is 
a nosological concept, comprising a well-
known cluster of depressive symptoms. 
When applied in clinical, therapeutic, or 
other practical contexts, the concept can 
be used–and is routinely used–to turn 
depressive illness into a continuum ranging 
from simple symptoms to severe chronic 
illness. Such a shift has created the problem 
of how to distinguish ‘clinically significant’ 
depression from normal sorrow. (Horwitz & 
Wakefield, 2007.) 
In Western countries today, depressions 
are mostly treated in primary health care, 
so it is a general practitioner who in most 
cases is responsible for diagnosis and 
treatment. This is the gold standard defined 
unanimously by national guidelines for 
depression treatment and is the state of 
affairs in real life. (Callahan & Berrios, 
2005: 136-153; Helén, 2007a: 151-152, 158-
159; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 184-185.) 
Originally, the category of major depression 
was defined on the basis of clinical and 
epidemiological research in psychiatric 
hospitals and outpatient clinics. However, 
it has been shown by numerous studies 
(e.g. Blacker & Clare, 1987; Freeling, 1995; 
Freeling et al., 1985; Goldberg, 1979; 
Paykel & Priest, 1992; Poutanen, 1996) that 
the appearance of depression in primary 
care is considerably different from its 
appearance in specialised psychiatric care. 
GPs predominantly encounter patients 
with rather non-specific symptoms of 
dejectedness or disorderly mood, and 
various forms of depression ‘masked’ in 
somatic or behavioural symptoms, instead 
of patients showing symptoms that readily 
indicate major depression and the degree 
of the disorder (mild, moderate, or severe). 
As a result, mild and chronic forms of 
depression and a great variety of depressive 
symptoms form the core of depressive 
illness in primary health care. 
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Current mental health reasoning has 
responded to this problem by disseminating 
depressive illness. Depression can for 
example be considered a psychosomatic 
illness due to the fact that depressive 
disorders are in many cases eclipsed by 
somatic symptoms and patients’ complaints 
about physical illness. In addition, two 
different ways exist of trying to solve the 
difficulties of GPs in making a distinction 
between depression and normal reactions 
caused by stressful situations and in 
distinguishing between a depressive 
disorder and an anxiety disorder when the 
patient’s symptoms are a mixture of both. 
Depression has been conceived of as either 
being an adjustment disorder–which brings 
it into the realm of personality disorders–or 
being comparable to a stress disorder. The 
DSM language provides a foundation for 
these views because it offers means to define 
different variations through categories 
such as ‘dysthymic disorder’, ‘adjustment 
disorder with depressed mood’, ‘adjustment 
disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed 
mood’, ‘atypical depression’, ‘depression 
not otherwise specified’, etc (for a detailed 
analysis, see Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 
104-122). However, this diagnostic diversity 
can subvert the paradigmatic position of 
major depression by shifting the focus 
of depression diagnosis and treatment 
to the detection of individual symptoms, 
especially in primary health care.
This dissolution has been to a great 
extent facilitated by diagnostic devices that 
mental health authorities, professional 
organisations and pharmaceutical 
companies design and distribute to 
GPs to help them detect and diagnose 
depressive illness more efficiently. ‘Rating 
scales’ used as diagnostic instruments in 
epidemiological, pharmaceutical, and 
clinical research have been modified into 
a variety of depression scales in the form 
of checklists that are readily available for 
physicians on the Internet and as notepads 
with fill-in forms (see below). In addition, 
the GPs are provided with the kinds of 
‘tools’ for differential diagnosis shown in 
Figure 2. This particular scheme is from 
an authorised depression management 
guideline in the U.S., and a similar type 
of diagnostic path is also presented in 
Figure 2.  Differential diagnosis of primary mood disorders (Depression in primary care, vol. 
1, 1993: 20).
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Appendix A of DSM-IV. A noteworthy route 
in the diagram leads from the symptoms of 
‘sad mood or low interest’ to the diagnosis 
of ‘depression not otherwise specified’. 
Although the latter is considered a residual 
category, it nevertheless is a diagnostic 
option that a physician can use when 
deciding whether or not a patient showing 
few depressive symptoms is suffering from a 
treatable mental disorder. This implicates a 
kind of reduction of the depressive disorder 
to single symptoms and ultimately leads to a 
view solely focused on a person’s low mood 
or apathetic existence. However, with such a 
focus, it is difficult to see where depression 
begins and where it ends. Yet, these kinds of 
‘algorithms’ encourage and justify the use of 
antidepressants to relieve patients’ sadness, 
hopelessness, or ‘feeling blue’. It is a clinical 
pathway to a medication of mood.
Risk factors
Mental health experts and public authorities 
involved in the mainstream mental health 
discussion often consider feelings and 
behaviour traits listed as the symptoms 
of depressive disorders in the dominant 
DSM-IV definition also as health risks to the 
person. However, thinking of depression 
in terms of risk is actually related to the 
problematisation of depressive illness in 
the population and as a public health 
issue. Thus, the risk concept of depression 
is closely related to the public health 
management of depressive illness aiming 
at prevention, early detection and early 
intervention by the means of population 
screening and making diagnostic practices 
and treatment of depression in primary 
health care more efficient (see e.g. Helén, 
2007b; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 145-163). 
Moreover, the idea of risk greatly facilitated 
the transformation of depression into a 
major public health problem, as I will show 
below.
The number of people with a depressive 
disorder is today enormously larger than 
50 or 60 years ago; one can even speak of a 
thousand-fold increase in the prevalence of 
depression (Healy, 2004: 2). Consequently, 
depression has become a major public 
health problem, worldwide. This amazing 
development would not have happened 
without psychiatric epidemiology, which 
has become a cornerstone of psychiatry and 
mental health care since the 1960s. Without 
studies focusing on ‘mental morbidity’ 
in the population mental illness would 
not have become a phenomenon of great 
numbers–epistemically, commercially 
and as a matter of public policy. Moreover, 
in the attempts to make psychiatry more 
scientific the triumph of the styles of 
reasoning familiar from epidemiology 
and social medicine–statistical induction, 
probability calculus and risk estimation–
has been much more crucial than the rise of 
psychopharmacology and neuropsychiatry. 
It is nowadays almost impossible to present 
claims about mental health facts without 
supporting them by statistical analysis of 
data from epidemiological questionnaires 
or randomised clinical trials. (Healy, 2002: 
320-333; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007:123-
143.) 
Censuses of the mentally ill for the 
purposes of general population census 
and poor relief administration were carried 
out in the U.S., Britain, Germany and the 
Nordic countries since the late 19th century. 
However, modern psychiatric epidemiology 
is not about counting the number of inmates 
classified as insane in institutions of 
incarceration but about analysis of all types 
of factors related to mental disturbances 
in individuals and populations. Such 
an approach emerged in Anglo-Saxon 
psychiatry during the Second World War. 
In Britain and the U.S., this new ‘social 
psychiatry’ originated from two sources. 
First, studies on the psychological effects of 
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wartime conditions and on the prevalence 
of psychiatric symptoms in the general 
population were launched and extensive 
surveys of the psychological conditions of the 
combat forces were carried out, especially in 
the U.S. Second, some psychiatrists started 
surveying large numbers of psychiatric 
patients to search for social factors that 
apply to all patients.3 (Healy, 2002: 136-139; 
Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007:124-126; Rose, 
1996: 133-135.) Toward the late 1950s, the 
rise of community psychiatry supported 
the growth of population studies of mental 
disorders, as did the increasing interest in 
studying the prevalence and treatment of 
mental illness in primary health care. In the 
1960’s, more and more studies on mental 
illness in general population were started 
on the both sides of the Atlantic. First results 
of the Midtown Manhattan project were 
published in the U.S. in 1962, and Michael 
Shepherd’s group published the pioneering 
work Psychiatric illness in general practice 
in Britain in 1966. An epidemiology of 
depressive illness focusing on the general 
population and primary care practice 
grew out of this soil. This started in the 
early 1970s and expanded in the 1980s and 
1990s. (Callahan & Berrios, 2005: 133-136; 
Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 127-138; Healy, 
1997: 229.) This research has been seminal 
in helping the national and international 
health authorities consolidate the present 
depression management standard, and 
it has greatly facilitated the increase in 
antidepressant medication (Helén, 2007a: 
157-167).  
The epidemiological approach and 
reasoning have induced changes in the 
object of mental health thought and 
practice. Mental diseases are no longer 
considered more or less rigid clinical 
entities, and mental health care is instead 
directed towards ‘psychiatric morbidity’, 
which refers to a wide range of impaired 
psychological or behavioural functionality. 
Such a widening of the target area of mental 
health care has required three epistemic 
transitions in psychiatry. The first one is 
the emergence of the concept of mental 
illness as multifactorial, as a system or 
synergism of biological, psychological, 
and social factors. This idea achieved its 
breakthrough alongside the community 
and social psychiatry movements from the 
late 1950s to 1970s. It was mainly related to 
the reform and policy that made outpatient 
care the main form of psychiatric care in 
the West. (Helén, 2007b.) More important 
epistemic shifts in the context of this paper 
are the increasing emphasis on symptoms 
and the development of health risk as a core 
concept. These two are more directly related 
to psychiatric epidemiology. 
Structured questionnaires and 
assessment scales are the main instruments 
focusing more intensively on the symptoms 
and risks of mental disorders. They are 
essential in psychiatric epidemiology when 
data is analysed and decisions are made 
whether a ‘case’ belongs to the group of 
people suffering from the disorder or not. 
The first structured ‘diagnostic instruments’ 
providing data suitable for statistical 
analysis were developed for the purposes of 
clinical research in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
They provided a model for questionnaires 
and scales designed for epidemiological 
research of mental disorders, such as the 
DSM based Diagnostic Interview Schedule 
(DIS) and Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) that are 
commonly used in the current epidemiology 
of depressive illness.4 However, they are by 
no means the only ones. In the early 1990s, 
one could find over 30 ‘rating scales’, both 
general and more specified, in research 
literature (Snaith, 1993; for a review, see 
Rabkin & Klein, 1987; Sartorius & Ban, 
1986), and their number has increased since 
then. Quite a few are also readily available 
on the Internet. However, none of them 
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has succeeded in becoming the ultimate 
criterion for psychiatric epidemiology. On 
the contrary, each of the scales is subject 
to on-going dispute over the validity, 
reliability, and applicability of the results it 
provides. In practice, studies seldom rely on 
only one rating scale and instead deploy two 
to four diagnostic instruments side by side 
(e.g. Poutanen, 1996). 
Despite their problems, rating scales play 
a key role in the epidemiology of mental 
disorders for two reasons. First, they ensure 
that the symptoms enter into the field of 
epidemiological perception. Second, they 
connect risks with concrete phenomena and 
thus establish risk factors. In fact, diagnostic 
instruments form the core of the equipment 
used to understand and observe mental 
health that epidemiology brought into the 
heart of psychiatry. This apparatus has been 
made part of the routines of every field of 
mental health care. It is a tool for clinical 
trials as well as population surveys; it is an 
essential element of clinical assessment 
in fields ranging from general practice 
to psychotherapy; it is deployed in the 
marketing of drugs and other therapies; and 
such scales are available for personal mental 
health assessment and mood monitoring 
on the Internet and in popular literature. 
(Hautamäki, 2007: 126-127; Healy, 1997, 
97-100; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 130-136, 
140-164; Martin, 2007: 177-196.) 
Most importantly, this apparatus has 
made it possible to see psychopathologies–
or, in more current terms, ‘mental disorders’–
as a widespread public health problem. The 
rating scale equipment has brought about 
a shift in psychiatric perception of mental 
phenomena. This shift has implied that 
symptoms and risks are the primary targets 
of mental health thinking and practice. 
In addition, the focus on symptoms and 
risks allows the kinds of arguments and 
estimations presented by recent studies 
in the U.S. and the EU according to which 
27–28 % of the adult population suffers 
from a diagnosable mental disorder5, and 
every other person will become ill with a 
mental disorder sometime in their lives 
(Kessler et al., 2005; Wittchen et al., 2005; 
see Rose, 2006: 467-470.) Such a view of 
the prevalence of mental disorders is not 
a recent development, but it is an intrinsic 
trait of the epidemiological approach, 
notable already in the early community 
mental health surveys in the 1960s and 
early 1970s (Helén, 2007b; Horwitz & 
Wakefield, 2007: 123-138). For example, the 
first Finnish population surveys of mental 
illness allowed epidemiologists to state that 
up to 30% of Finns will suffer from a mental 
disorder during their adult life (Lehtinen 
& Väisänen, 1979: 121) and would benefit 
from psychiatric consultation or treatment 
(Lehtinen, 1975: 121). In a similar vein, 
depression literature, both professional 
and lay, underlines time and again that 
‘almost everybody will fall ill with a minor 
depressive episode during his or her life 
and one out of four will suffer from major 
depression’ (Tamminen, 2001: 52).
Epidemiological understanding of the 
object and scope of mental health care is 
certainly congruent with the change in 
clinical understanding, epitomised by the 
DSM definition of mental disorder:
Each of mental disorders is 
conceptualized as a clinically significant 
behavioural or psychological syndrome 
or pattern that occurs in an individual 
and that is associated with present 
distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or 
disability (e.g., impairment in one or 
more important areas of functioning) 
or with significantly increased risk of 
suffering death, pain, disability, or an 
important loss of freedom. (...) Whatever 
its original course, it must currently 
be considered a manifestation of a 
behavioural, psychological, or biological 
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dysfunction in the individual. (DSM-IV-
TR: xxxi.)
The definition clearly states that the object 
of mental health care is neither madness 
nor disease. But what is it? First, mental 
disorder is always related to the individual, 
to his or her behaviour or psyche; it is 
personal but not the person. Furthermore, 
the disorder should be clinically verified. 
But what should a physician, psychiatrist, 
or therapist look for? The definition lists 
a range of options including distress or 
malady personally experienced by the 
patient or impairment, dysfunctionality, 
or risks observed by health professionals. 
Thus, the field of work of mental health care 
is defined as very broad, while the object of 
mental health care remains equivocal. 
Widening of the scope of psychiatry 
and the inclusion of multiple and 
heterogeneous objects into its domain is 
not a particularly recent development. 
At the end of the Second World War and 
during the decades after war, deployment 
of psychiatry and psychotherapy multiplied 
and expanded in social work, general 
medicine, education, management 
etc. throughout the Western world, the 
American psychodynamic psychiatry and 
also early psychopharmacology leading 
the way. This development can be traced 
back to the mental hygiene movement in 
many Western countries between the two 
World Wars and even to the late 19th century 
campaigns against ‘nervousness’. (E.g. 
Hale, 1995: 257-299; Horwitz, 2002: 38-55; 
Thomson, 1995). This preceded expansion 
explains a great deal of the success of the 
catch-all diagnostic categories of the new 
DSM and ICD-10 manuals. They are well 
suited to dispersing mental health care 
and a situation in which mental health 
experts try to manage ‘disorders’ whose 
variety seems to be boundless. Important 
aspects of this transition are certainly that 
the disease model has been extended into 
many areas of social life and morality, and 
that providers of mental health care have 
become a major agent of social control. 
(Horwitz, 2002; Mayes & Horwitz, 2005; 
Rose, 2006.) However, what seems crucial 
regarding the present development is the 
shift of mental health care towards the field 
of risk management (Helén, 2007b; Rose, 
2006.) 
A close affinity between the 
epidemiological, classificatory and 
pharmacological ways of approaching their 
objects (see Helén, 2007a: 160, 163-164) has 
greatly facilitated the transition of mental 
health care into risk management. The 
diagnostic instruments used in population 
surveys and clinical trials are compatible 
with the DSM and ICD manuals, since they 
define mental disorders as a thing-like entity 
and describe it as a collage of symptoms. 
This compatibility is important for clinical 
practice, and the checklist format provides 
the basis for making ‘diagnostic toolkits’ for 
general practitioners to help them recognise 
depression–or bipolar, anxiety, or attention 
disorder or any other of a number of ‘brain 
diseases’ for which such detection devices 
are developed. These tools are simplified 
questionnaires and rating scales aimed at 
indicating if the patient shows symptoms 
or not. (see Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 147-
163.) Today, a great variety of mental rating 
scales are also available on the websites of 
public health authorities, professional and 
patients’ organisations, and pharmaceutical 
companies to be used as a kind of everyman’s 
self-assessment device. (Hautamäki, 2007: 
126-127; Martin, 2007:177-196.)
My example is the DEPS scale (see Figure 
3), developed in the Tampere Depression 
Study in the early 1990s in Finland. The 
scale has a double function. It was originally 
developed as a diagnostic tool for GPs, 
but it also served as an epidemiological 
assessment device in the study (Salokangas, 
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Poutanen & Stengård, 1995; on the TADEP 
study, see Helén, 2007a: 157-158). DEPS also 
exemplifies a close connection between the 
above-mentioned concepts of depression 
and medication. Notepads with empty 
DEPS forms were widely disseminated to 
Finnish physicians in order to familiarise 
them with the scale; the notepads and their 
distribution were sponsored by Lundbeck, 
the manufacturer of Cipramil, which is 
the most sold SSRI antidepressant in the 
Nordic countries. Today, the DEPS scale 
is also easily accessible on a website for 
medical advice (www.tohtori.fi) sponsored 
by Lundbeck . 
An essential issue here is a tendency 
that emerges when depressive symptoms 
are approached through structured 
questionnaires and scales, for then the 
clinical and epidemiological interpretations 
of the answers start to merge. In the clinical-
therapeutic context, the answers and 
the figures provided by the rating scales 
are considered symptoms of depressive 
disorder. In the epidemiological context, 
they are however indications of an increased 
likelihood or susceptibility, i.e. risk, of the 
onset of depression. In the current mental 
health discussion in the West, these aspects 
are merged so that talk of risks tends to 
become personalised, and the symptoms 
are increasingly seen as indications of 
possible or probable illness.  
The DEPS scale epitomises both the 
tendency to mix symptoms and risks 
and to focus increasingly on risks. This 
is an important development. The 
epidemiological approach has induced an 
anticipatory rationale in psychiatry and 
mental health care so that these are no 
longer targeted at actual mental diseases or 
disorders but at risks and susceptibilities, at 
potential mental disorders. 
Depression has been related to mental 
health risks in two ways. Originally, 
epidemiological studies emphasised the 
relationships between depressive illness 
and suicide so that depression represented 
the most ‘predictive factor’ for suicide. This 
was an important impetus for anti-suicide 
and anti-depression campaigns in different 
countries from the 1980s onwards. (e.g. 
Lönnqvist, 1988.) Today, epidemiology 
predominantly emphasises the risks of 
depressive illness itself, with the assumption 
that any of the symptoms listed in the rating 
scales or DSM/ICD checklists indicate 
an increased risk of depression. Or as a 
 Figure 3. The DEPS scale (Salokangas, Poutanen & Stengärd, 1995: 11).
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Finnish manual puts it: ‘The emergence of 
depressive symptoms in a patient indicates 
a fourfold increased threat of falling ill 
with depression, as compared to the ones 
without symptoms’ (Tamminen, 2001: 
52). This perspective has also been widely 
adopted in clinical practice. All over the 
Western world, a central practical problem 
with the depression epidemic was the 
shortcomings of primary care physicians in 
recognising depression; this, in turn, lead 
to an underdiagnosis of the illness. What 
GPs were actually supposed to ‘recognise’ 
were the patient’s symptoms, and this 
should have been followed by anticipatory 
measures targeted at preventing the onset 
of an illness that could possibly threaten the 
patient. According to this logic, depression 
treatment extended into the area between 
normal ‘feeling low’ or sorrow and severe 
major depression, including also mild 
depression and other depressive conditions 
mentioned above. (Callahan & Berrios, 2005: 
139-153; Helén, 2007a, 151-153; Horwitz & 
Wakefield, 2007.) As a result, a plethora of 
maladies and irregular behaviour became 
treated as depression.
Care and control
If symptoms and risks are emphasised in the 
current concept of depression, what actually 
is treated when ‘depressive disorder’ is 
treated? What are the aims of the treatment, 
and how does the dominant concept direct 
the therapeutic rationale? 
The depression treatment standard was 
gradually developed in the West from the 
mid-1980s to the late-1990s (see Callahan 
& Berrios, 2005: 121-153; Helén, 2007a: 151-
152, 158-159). The rationale was adopted 
from maintenance treatment, a mainstream 
form of psychiatric treatment that was 
established with the expansion of the 
outpatient care and psychopharmacology. 
Mental health professionals use 
‘maintenance treatment’ to refer to a 
procedure applied in cases of severe mental 
disorder when medication is continued after 
the patient’s symptoms have disappeared 
and he or she has recovered. This is done 
to prevent relapses, and the medication 
in fact becomes permanent not only for 
some but, in fact, most patients. In the 
case of depressive disorders, the practice is 
justified by the epidemiological fact of high 
recurrence of major depression. In other 
words, the main factor predicting an onset 
of depressive illness is a previous episode 
of depression, and therefore depression 
is treated presymptomatically in the form 
of maintenance treatment. The object of 
medication is a potential disorder that is 
articulated as the patient’s risk of recurring 
depression.
The above treatment rationale was 
formulated at the same time as the 
epidemiology of depression began to 
cumulate internationally and the tricyclic 
antidepressants acquired the leading 
therapeutic role in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Thus the idea of maintenance treatment of 
depression preceded the breakthrough of 
the SSRIs. What Prozac, Cipramil and other 
serotonin selective substances did was to 
facilitate the expansion of the application 
of risk logic in overall management of 
depressive disorders, including general 
practice. The current standard of depression 
treatment contains a preventive rationale 
implicitly promoting medication even 
in less severe depressions. Depression is 
regarded as a not only highly recurrent 
but also progressive. This view implies 
the idea that minor depressive symptoms 
left without treatment will become more 
severe, multiply, and finally lead to 
severe major depression. Mental health 
experts therefore consider the immediate 
treatment of depressive symptoms (low 
mood, sleeping difficulties or irritability, 
for example) vitally important in order to 
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prevent the onset of depressive disorder. 
In the early 1990s, when Prozac and other 
SSRIs had just entered the market and the 
activities for implementing the depression 
management standard were at their peak in 
the U.S. and many European countries, the 
antidepressants, especially the SSRIs, were 
recommended for the treatment of all types 
of depression and depressive symptoms, 
because they were claimed to be the easiest 
means of acute intervention. (Healy, 2004: 
9-11, 30-39; Helén, 2007a: 164-166; Horwitz 
& Wakefield, 2007: 179-193.) Later, mental 
health experts have become uncertain about 
the effectiveness of drug treatment for mild 
depression as international research began 
providing contradictory evidence on the 
issue. Today, many authorised guidelines 
recommend brief cognitive therapy as the 
first-choice treatment of mild depressions. 
(E.g. Spigset & Mårtenson, 1999; NICE, 2004; 
Käypä hoito: Depressio, 2009.) However, 
institutions proving mental health care lack 
psychotherapy resources, and medication 
remains the first option available for 
physicians, especially in primary care 
when treating depressive symptoms and 
mild depression and trying to prevent the 
condition from becoming more severe.    
All in all, depressive symptoms are not 
primarily perceived to be indications of 
mental illness in the context of today’s 
depression management. Instead, they are 
seen as an increased risk of the person to 
develop depression, originating either from 
his or her life situation or inborn disposition. 
In any case, the acute treatments of 
depressive symptoms or ‘mild depression’ 
by drugs or by therapy based on talking 
are largely targeted at the risk of depressive 
illness and are thus preventive procedures.
However, the preventive nature of 
depression treatment is equivocal. The 
mainstream notion in both professional 
and lay discussions is that depression is a 
severe and, in most cases, chronic disease. 
Due to this, mental health rationale puts a 
sort of double exposure on the treatment 
of depressive symptoms. On the one 
hand, medication, supportive talk, or 
psychotherapy is seen to prevent the onset of 
illness, but on the other, they are considered 
acute therapies of a disease that shares 
many characteristics of chronic diseases 
like diabetes. In fact, diabetes and insulin 
treatment are the most popular parallel 
to depressive illness and antidepressant 
medication in the literature. This ambiguity 
has engendered a tendency of depression 
to become a chronic condition through the 
treatment procedure targeted at depressive 
symptoms; medication is particularly 
inclined to do this (see Healy, 2004: passim.; 
Karp, 2006: 62-95).    
The core idea of ‘curing’ symptoms by 
an antidepressant or other means implies 
yet another mode of treatment. This is also 
anticipatory care, and it may go beyond 
both the reduction of depression risks and 
the treatment of illness. Perhaps it can be 
called proactive treatment. 
It has been claimed that SSRI 
antidepressants permit patients to re-
form themselves instead of being on guard 
against and struggling with the illness. 
Such alleged effects of medication have 
been presented especially in discussions 
of ‘cosmetic psychopharmacology’ and 
‘medical enhancement’ incited by Peter 
Kramer’s Listening to Prozac (1994). On 
the basis of his cases, Kramer claimed that 
SSRIs are able to provide people a means to 
alter the appearance of the self, to empower 
them and give them a choice over their 
emotions, reactions, and behaviour in 
different situations, in a word, to change 
their personality. Although he exaggerated 
or misconstrued the effects of the drugs–
the SSRIs are not ecstatic drugs, and they 
are too weak to be able to cause personality 
alteration (see Healy, 2004: 266-269)–his 
bestseller gave an impetus to the notion 
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that antidepressant medication is not just 
a remedy but also a means to modify what 
a living person is and what he or she is 
capable of doing. Prozac, Cipramil, Seroxat, 
etc. are among these enhancing or enabling 
medical devices that are claimed to be able 
to contribute to three types of modifications. 
First, they may enable the person to 
overcome, replace or circumvent his or her 
existing deficiency or even a characteristic 
that fits within the limits of normal variation. 
Second, they may help a person to manage 
personal risks or susceptibilities, or resolve 
minor symptoms. Kramer’s discussion was 
related to these two uses of ‘prozac’. Finally, 
the drug may restore the person within the 
normal limits of experience, behaviour 
and functionality; this aspect is usually 
emphasised in the personal narratives of 
antidepressant users (Helén, 2006; see also 
Karp, 2006: 62-95).
Prozac-type drugs as agents of 
normalisation, risk management or 
enablement are targeted at mood-related 
neurochemistry. Their effect is not 
immediate, since it takes a couple weeks 
for a therapeutic response to appear and 
they have to be used regularly. So, what 
Cipramil and similar drugs may contribute 
are alterations in the person’s general 
functionality and the tuning of their personal 
existence–‘mood’ often refers to the latter 
in psychological and psychiatric discourse 
(e.g. Larsen, 2001: 129-130; Whybrow, 1997: 
19). These changes may facilitate persons 
to carry out a significant transformation 
in their lives or even ‘personality changes’, 
but predominantly the users see the drugs 
helping them in normalising feelings and 
behaviour, or ‘getting their life back’ (Helén, 
2006; see also Karp, 2006: 62-95). Thus, 
medication affecting biochemical functions 
in the brain is conceived of as a device for 
regulating moods and bringing personal life 
under control. 
Pharmaceutical technology facilitates 
a transformation of depression treatment 
into a practice of adjusting personal mood 
to the demands of the situation. This could 
be called mood control. Some aspects of 
Kramer’s thinking and the widespread 
Prozac hype in the early 1990s shed light 
on the relationship between medication 
and mood control. Kramer did not reduce 
personality to the brain but instead 
considered it multiple. What someone is as 
a person is determined by what happens 
at the cell and molecular level in the brain, 
by interaction and relationships with other 
people, and by the care, upbringing, and 
life events encountered, especially the ones 
experienced in early childhood. The reason 
Kramer emphasised neurochemistry was 
his experience as a psychotherapist. In the 
light of his therapeutic experience, it seemed 
to be easier to reduce personal susceptibility 
to depression or panic attacks by regulating 
the biochemical functions of the brain than 
by analysing and influencing–or ‘working 
through’ in psychoanalytic language – the 
role, behaviour, and emotional reaction 
patterns that the person had internalised 
in the process of personality development. 
(Fraser, 2001.) From this perspective, all that 
we are as persons – biologically, socially, 
and psychologically–and every aspect of the 
condition we live in can be seen as divisible 
into elements, factors, and causal relations, 
which can in turn be measured, calculated, 
monitored, and manipulated. 
Beyond depression?
 
The depression paradigm seems very firm 
in mental health care worldwide. The 
epistemic foundation of the paradigm is a 
close affinity between the epidemiological, 
classificatory and pharmacological 
approach of the objects of mental health 
care. The DSM and ICD manuals define 
depression and other mental disorders in 
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such a manner that they provide targets 
specific enough for clinical treatment, 
especially for psychotropic medication. 
They also define mental illness as entities 
that can be measured and calculated both 
in epidemiological research and clinical 
trials in psychopharmacology, as well as 
in mental health policy, administration 
and economics. Standardisation of 
mental illness in a manner of depression 
is particularly important in the context of 
health insurance reimbursements. This 
epistemic interlocking of epidemiology, 
classification, clinical evaluation and 
therapeutic knowledge may well have 
created a harmony of illusions about both 
the object of mental health care and its 
effectiveness. In any case, the depression 
paradigm is able to facilitate the functions 
of globally expanding mental health 
machinery. (See Helén, 2007a: 160, 163-164; 
Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 104-191; Mayes 
& Horwitz, 2005: 250-251, 263-266; Wilson, 
1993: 408-409.)
The depression paradigm has also 
strong institutional back up. It has 
been instrumental in making evermore 
heterogeneous objects of knowledge and 
practice manageable and even improving 
their manageability when Western 
psychiatry has gone through a fundamental 
restructuring during the past 60 years. As 
well known, the change is characterised by 
dehospitalisation and a growing emphasis 
on out-patient care, community psychiatry 
and prevention, and an increasing blending 
of mental health care into many branches 
of medicine and social work. With this 
development depressive illness became the 
focus of mental health care. Moreover, the 
depression paradigm has been beneficial 
to the profession of the psychiatrists by 
helping them to maintain their professional 
status and integrity as psychiatry has been 
disseminated into society. (E.g. Grob, 1991; 
Horwitz, 2002.) Finally, it has provided 
the basis for many SSRI antidepressants 
to become blockbuster drugs and thus 
served well the economic interest of the 
multinational pharmaceutical enterprises 
(see Healy, 2004; Barber, 2008). 
Despite its seemingly solid position, 
the depression paradigm may scatter in 
the near future. The growing criticism of 
the diagnostic system (e.g. Cooper, 2004; 
Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007; Wakefield et 
al., 2002), the SSRI-antidepressants and 
medication regimes (e.g. Healy, 2004; 
Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 179-193; 
Moncrieff & Cohen, 2005), and the role of 
the psychiatric profession in creating and 
maintaining the paradigm (e.g. Healy 2004; 
Shorter, 2009) both inside and outside the 
psychiatric profession is undermining the 
current depression management standard. 
In the light of my analysis, I would however 
emphasise subverting features inherent in 
the depression paradigm. 
I claim that the dissolution of the very 
object of depression as both epistemic 
and practical core of the current mental 
health care seems quite plausible. The 
ways depression is defined in the present 
depression paradigm include a tendency 
of dissolution.  The medical concept of a 
depressive disease with clear somatic causes 
and aetiology seems to be scattered in the 
nosolocical rationale of current mental 
health thinking and the drug cartography 
of mental disorders. The definition of 
depressive disorder embedded in neo-
Kraepelinian nosology seems to disintegrate 
into the detection of individual depressive 
symptoms. Finally, symptoms seem to 
turn into risk factors in the context of 
epidemiology and preventive mental health 
care, and the role of risks in cutting-edge 
neuropsychiatry is diminishing as the focus 
is switched to personal or, rather, molecular 
susceptibilities on the levels of genome and 
neurochemistry (on the latter development, 
see Rose, 2007: 204-205).  
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Furthermore, what research and 
theoretical discussion have dissolved, 
practices seem to be unable to bring into 
coherence. Within the current standard of 
depression management the object of care 
and treatment is fundamentally ambivalent 
and presumably not what it is supposed to be 
as common reactions to loss or distress are 
treated as illness (see Horwitz & Wakefield, 
2007). It seems that depression treatment 
covers a continuum extending from severe 
pathological conditions to symptoms and 
promodral signs and further to risks and 
susceptibilities. 
Depressive disorder is often defined 
in the framework of the disease model as 
independent psychopathological entity 
in the current mental health thinking and 
practice. This view is embedded in the 
psychiatric knowledge and experience 
derived from the treatment of people who 
suffer from severe or chronic depression 
at mental hospitals and outpatient clinics. 
The wide autobiographical literature tends 
to supports this concept, since the authors 
usually tell about their personal struggle 
with depressive disease. However, my 
analysis in the previous section suggests that 
the focus of the professional rationale is not 
primarily the treatment of mood disorders 
but risk management. Since observation and 
practices in mental health care are primarily 
targeted at symptoms and risks, the most 
of  depression treatment takes place in the 
zone between normal sadness and severe 
depression, in the grey area of ‘moderate’, 
‘mild’ and ‘under threshold’ depressive 
conditions. This is the case especially with 
the so called primary care depression.
When physicians conceive of symptoms 
as indications of the increased risk of 
depressive illness, they do not see deep 
dejection, overwhelming sadness, low 
spirits or similar conditions as expressions 
of an actual illness. Rather, the latter 
are signs of possible and forthcoming 
disturbance of mind and behaviour, danger 
or susceptibility of the person’s inner life 
to become disordered.  With the latter 
focus, diagnosing a patient, intervention 
into his or her ‘depression’ and restoring of 
normalcy with the help of drugs, talk or both 
are anticipatory and preventive procedures 
aimed at an onset illness the patient might 
possibly face. Psychiatric intervention, 
psychotherapy or psychotropic medication 
is thus not a device of medical care but of 
control of living. 
This result of my analysis–that the aspect 
of monitoring and anticipatory control of 
personal living is increasingly emphasised in 
depression management–is congruent with 
the observations of Nikolas Rose and Emily 
Martin. According to them, Western mental 
health care is moving towards the practices 
of  assessing, anticipating, and controlling 
impairments and differences of human 
behaviour and experience and towards the 
management of personal feelings, desires 
and conduct beyond the treatment of 
illness (Rose, 2006; Martin, 2007: 197-219). 
This trend may well do away with medical 
concepts like ‘depression disorder’ that 
alludes to pathology and abnormality. A sort 
of promise of tailored mental management, 
similar to the visions of ‘personalised 
medicine’, will possibly be raised, if 
psychiatric applications of molecular 
genetics and neuroscience progress further 
and also the techniques of psychological 
and social risk assessment become more 
accurate. Then, treatment, care or control 
could be targeted directly to the factors, risks, 
and prospects of a problematic situation or 
to the characteristics, personality traits, or 
susceptibilities of a particular individual 
or group of people–especially to those 
related the neurophysiology. However, the 
actualisation of these hopes is not likely to 
happen very soon. (E.g. Rose, 2007: 198-209; 
Singh & Rose, 2009.)6 
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The shift in depression treatment towards 
the control of moods and personal conduct 
as a form of risk management has created a 
space for reasoning and discussion within 
mental health care in which numerous 
candidates to replace the depression 
paradigm have been presented. For example, 
the idea of a mood disorder spectrum (e.g. 
Akiskal & Akiskal, 2005; Angst & Cassano, 
2005; see also Healy, 2008: 198-219) and 
the resurrected concept of temperament–
today conceived of as a biopsychological 
typology of personality traits and closely 
connected with the ideas of individual 
variation based on brain chemistry and with 
genetic susceptibilities to mental disorders 
(see Rose, 2007: 188-209)–have been 
promoted as frameworks to diagnose and 
treat affective irregularities. Both of these 
concepts are open to many interpretations 
and may thus serve well numerous efforts 
to control and management of feelings and 
behaviour. 
However, even if ‘mood spectrum’, 
‘temperament’ or similar concepts 
managed to overshadow the disorder 
concept defined by the DSM rationale as the 
cornerstone of mental health thinking and 
practice, the basic dilemma would remain 
unsolved: when mental functions of the 
person become disordered, should his or 
her condition be conceived of as a natural 
kind of object or a personal experience and 
a state of existence, happening in unique 
circumstances? 
Notes
1 When consulting the World Health 
Organization in making the section on 
psychiatric and neurological diseases 
for ICD at the end of the 1950s and the 
early 1960s, Erwin Stengel was presented 
with about 60 different classifications of 
depressive illnesses, with considerable 
variation between them (Stengel, 1964).
2 NIMH became interested in the problems 
of diagnostic categories when it launched 
a big research programme to test Joseph 
Schildkraut’s (1965) hypothesis that 
depression is caused by a reduction 
in brain catecholamines. When trying 
to recruit a homogeneous group of 
depressives for tests, it became obvious 
to the research group that the diagnostic 
criteria were equivocal. Attempts to solve 
this problem led to the development of 
the RDC. (Healy 2002: 299-301.) 
3 The pioneers in using the methods 
of social medicine in psychiatry were 
George Rosen in the U.S. and Aubrey 
Lewis in Britain (Healy, 2002: 136-137).
4 Hamilton’s scale was developed by the 
British psychiatrist Max Hamilton for 
clinical trials of tricyclic antidepressants 
at the end of the 1950s, while Beck’s 
inventory is an offspring of Aaron 
Beck, an American psychiatrist and 
the developer of the cognitive therapy 
for depression (Healy, 1997: 98-99). 
Schedule for Assessment of Affective 
Disorders and Schizophrenia (SADS), 
one of the first structured interview for 
clinical use, was developed by Robert 
Spitzer in the late 1970s, and it provided 
an important model for DIS, deployed in 
the first national epidemiology of mental 
illness in the U.S. in the early 1980s, and 
CIDI. (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007: 95, 
130-131). 
5 This represents over 57 million Americans 
and well over 80 million people in the EU.
6 It should be emphasized that the current 
SSRI drugs do not have specific effects in 
this sense, although Prozac, Cipramil and 
other similar drugs were marketed as a 
kind of magic bullets for depression. Their 
therapeutic effects are imprecise, and for 
a great number of patients they either are 
ineffective or cause considerable adverse 
effects. Moreover, the therapeutic scope 
of SSRIs has become so wide that they 
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seem to be a sort of patent remedy to 
all sort of distress and mental malady. 
(Healy, 2004: 263-265; Moncrieff & 
Cohen, 2005; Rose, 2007: 201-203.)  
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